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The Court Psychiatrist: Between Two Worlds
Carol E. R. Bohmer*
This article will examine the role of the court psychiatrist in the
sentencing of a convicted defendant. It is the author's contention
that this role conflicts with the psychiatric profession's perceptions
of the proper role of the psychiatrist.
The vehicle used to explain the psychiatrist's position in disposition of the criminal will be the psychiatric presentence report. This
report is prepared and presented to the court at the request of the
sentencing judge and is used by him in making his decision.'
The material for this article was collected as part of a major
research project examining the work of the Philadelphia court psychiatric clinic. The psychiatric reports written by the clinic were
evaluated, and interviews were conducted with judges in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Division as well as with the court psychiatrists themselves.2 The role conflicts which became apparent from
this research will be analyzed to determine how and why they arise
and how they are resolved.
A major focus of the psychiatric court clinic is the evaluation of
convicted offenders prior to sentencing.' This evaluation usually
culminates in a written report which discusses the defendant's psychiatric and social history, his current mental status, a diagnosis of
any psychiatric abnormality, some explanation of the behavior
which led him to court, and a prediction about future behavior. The
reports also include a recommendation by the psychiatrist in his
advisory capacity as to the most suitable legal and psychiatric dis* J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.
1. For a discussion on how a judge makes such a determination, see Hogarth, Sentencing
as a Human Process, in CANADIAN STUDIES INCRIMINOLOGY 236-38 (1971); Bohmer, Judicial
Use of Psychiatric Reports in the Sentencing of Sex Offenders, I J. PSYCH. & L. 223 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bohmer].
2. The results of this research are reported in Bohmer, supra note 1, and Bohmer, Bad or
Mad: The Psychiatristin the Sentencing Process, 4 J. PSYCH. & L. 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Psychiatrist in Sentencing].
3. For a detailed description of the several functions of psychiatric court clinics, see
Harman, Social Issues and the CourtPsychiatricClinic, 33 FED. PROBATION 37 (1969); Russell,
Massachusetts Court Clinics: A Study of its Adminisiration and Community Aspects, 13
INT'L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY 140 (1969); Seligsohn, PsychiatricCourt Clinics, 29 TEMP. L.Q.
347 (1956).
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position of the offender. This recommendation (and the report
wherein it is contained) is one of the pieces of data used by the
judge in making a sentencing decision. There is some disagreement
in the research as to the impact of the recommendations on the
ultimate sentence.' However, despite this dispute, the recommendations are considered the most important item by many judges.5
Court clinic psychiatrists perform very different tasks from those
of their colleagues in private practice or in psychiatric hospitals.
The court psychiatrist may in fact be seen as having two "clients":
the offender and the judge. Problems of role conflict may arise here
because of the pressures felt by the psychiatrist in carrying out his
duties toward each "client." A psychiatrist is trained to (a) help
individuals; (b) help only willing patients; and (c) develop a private, personal, and confidential relationship with his client. The
evaluation of an unwilling offender with whom the psychiatrist has
no further personal contact, and about whom he writes a report to
be read by a third party violates all of the above elements of the
psychiatrist's orientation. The report written for the judge may advocate a disposition which paternalistically may be seen to be "in
the best interests of the offender," but which may be far from an
ideal disposition in the eyes of the offender.
The psychiatrist therefore is providing a service for the court and
not for the patient. Nevertheless, court psychiatrists have been
quick to point out that they work as consultants to the judge and
emphasize their independence from the attorneys in the case. Typi4. Manfred Guttmacher asserts that over 90% of the recommendations made were followed by the judge. Guttmacher, Adult Court Psychiatric Clinics, 106 AM. J. PSYCH. 881
(1950).
In contrast, my research reveals a much lower percentage of cases in which the judge agreed
with the psychiatrist's recommendation. When a prison sentence was recommended, the rate
of concordance between recommendation and sentence was about 40%; for a sentence of
probation the rate was about 50%. See Psychiatrist in Sentencing, supra note 2. See also
Bohmer, supra note 1.
There are many who feel that the psychiatrist's relationship with the court would be less
strained if specific recommendations were omitted from the reports. See, e.g., S. HALLECK,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 248 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HALLECK]. It is the
opinion of this author that omitting specific recommendations would do little, if anything,
to solve the many problems in this area. My research also indicates that judges are ambivalent about specific recommendations: on the one hand they resent being told what to do; on
the other, they accuse those psychiatrists who do not make recommendations of sitting on
the fence.
5. In my interviews, more judges than not said that the recommendation was the most
important part of the report. See Bohmer, supra note 1, at 235.
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cal comments from the court psychiatrists included: "We are independent professionals, not agents of the prosecution;" "I work for
the judge, not the district attorney or the defense." The term
"friend of the court" was also used to describe the psychiatrist's role
as one removed from the adversary process. A similar view was
taken by the psychiatrist who considered that he was self-employed.
Such comments suggest a need by the psychiatrist to rationalize
an uncomfortable position created in the court clinic situation by
the lack of a clear definition of who is the client. The offender might
be considered the client, but he has no control over "his" psychiatrist, unlike the client in a private practice, who has the ultimate
control, the power to discontinue his role as a client.' The offender's
only right in this situation is to refuse to speak to the psychiatrist,
an action which is likely to count against him at sentencing; he has
shown himself to be uncooperative and may therefore be treated
more harshly
From the defendant's point of view, fairness would demand that
in all adversarial interviews, i.e., interviews by the court psychiatrist or any psychiatrist not hired by the defendant, he be informed
that he is not the psychiatrist's client so that he can respond accordingly. Occasionally, a psychiatrist makes his position clear; for example, a psychiatrist hired by the prosecution may point out that
he is not there to help the defendant, and that the defendant should
be aware of the psychiatrist's "enemy" status.8 However, the extent
6.

"The client who is not the employer has very little control over professional services."
(1970).
7. There was no consensus among court clinic psychiatrists as to how to handle defendants
who refuse to speak to them. One reported that he sends such an offender back to court
without trying to persuade him to speak. Another puts pressure on a defendant: "If you don't
want to talk to us, you are in contempt of court, and we will send you for observation for
sixty days, and if they can't learn about you from your behavior, off you go to Farview." These
threats are both inaccurate and a distortion of how the legal process actually works. However,
the defendant is unlikely to know that, and in any event will probably be harmed by his
refusal to speak, whether pressure is put on him or not. (Farview is the hospital for the
criminally insane in eastern Pennsylvania.)
It is, however, fair to say that a court psychiatrist is inclined to have less patience with an
uncooperative offender who is referred to him than he would have with his own private client.
The court psychiatrist realizes that the offender has been referred to him for a psychiatric
examination and that there is very little chance that the offender will be referred to him for
further treatment. Under those circumstances the court psychiatrist will waste little time,
and use little tact and discretion, in soliciting the cooperation of the patient.
8. This issue has recently been addressed by one court. In Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365
Mass. 265, 311 N.E.2d 47 (1974), the defendant was entitled to invoke the patientpsychotherapist privilege where he was not advised prior to making communications to the
W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RuLEs 205
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of such practice is open to question, because many psychiatrists feel
that taking such an adversarial stance will interfere with the rapport
needed to conduct an adequate psychiatric interview.'
In the court clinic interview, some defendants may know without
being told that the court psychiatrist is not their friend. These defendants refuse to open themselves up to the psychiatrist for help,
realizing their confidences will later be used against them. As one
psychiatrist stated, "Some of them know what I am doing, through
having been in the system. They look on me as a punitive figure who
can harm them in some way and help them in some way." But a
defendant unaware of the true situation is more fortunate than
many if he is interviewed by a psychiatrist who explains what is
happening to him-some psychiatrists will in fact lie to defendants.
Said one, "We don't tell them who we are unless they appear to be
confused. We make sure they know we are not the enemy [although
sometimes] we turn out to be the enemy."
If the offender can afford it (which most cannot), he can engage
his own psychiatrist who can present a report on behalf of his client
to the court. However, although the offender here is truly the psychiatrist's client, the report is not the official court-ordered report
and therefore will not have the same status as that of the court
psychiatrist..
A further source of role conflict and a further distinction from the
traditional psychiatric role can be found in the limited nature of the
court psychiatrist's duties. He serves only as advisor and evaluator
and has no real opportunity either to treat or to conduct follow-up
investigations of the outcome of his recommendations. Only by accipsychiatrist that they would not be privileged. A defendant who is examined for the status
of a "sexually dangerous person" would normally fall within an exception to the privilege
under Massachusetts law. When the psychiatrist did not inform the defendant of this fact,
however, the defendant was considered to be the psychiatrist's client in the traditional sense
of the word, and therefore entitled to invoke the privilege. Such a decision is likely to put
pressure on psychiatrists to make their status clear in such cases.
I
Ralph Slovenko, who writes extensively on the issues of psychiatric privilege and confidentiality, advises psychiatrists to do just this. "While some consider this naive, psychiatrists
carrying out an examination pursuant to court order should caution the accused that communications are not privileged, notwithstanding the possible resultant loss of valuable information." R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 446 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SLOVENK0].
9. On the other hand, Halleck indicated that he considered the articulation of his enemy
status a useful tool to disarm a defendant. In his experience, telling a defendant that the
psychiatrist was his enemy made him talk. "Psychiatrists have many ways of making people
talk." Paper presented by Seymour Halleck at the American Society of Criminology Meetings, at Tucson, Arizona (November 6, 1976).
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dent rather than by design, does he see some of his "clients" again,
in cases where the offender subsequently commits another crime
and is returned to the court clinic for reevaluation.
Because he may feel unable to help the offenders whom he sees,
the psychiatrist may believe that he is not appropriately fulfilling
this professional role. Sometimes the psychiatrist's training and orientation becomes overpowering and he makes efforts to treat the
defendant during the evaluation. As one psychiatrist stated, "I
enjoy talking to people. I am the slowest interviewer here. I like to
give them a feeling of what treating is all about-I do treating when
I am talking to them." Said another, "The interviews are a sort of
one-shot treatment, like a friend or relative."
Psychiatrists in general, however, see evaluation and treatment
as very different tasks conducted under different conditions. Consistent with this view, one psychiatrist in the court clinic not only sees
his role as having nothing to do with treatment, but is in fact glad
to be relieved of the task of treating the defendants he sees in the
clinic because they are such poor candidates for therapy. "I have no
responsibility to see the person-after. I don't have to worry about
getting the person better. I would be pretty frustrated if I would
have to treat the people I see here."
The attempt to expand the psychiatric role from one of merely
evaluating to something broader or perhaps more closely related to
traditional private practice can also be seen in such matters as the
recommendations made. Thus, when a psychiatrist was questioned
in an interview why he recommended that the offender be sent to a
type of facility that did not exist, the response was that he was
thereby indicating to the judge the need for such facilities. This
psychiatrist perceived himself as fulfilling an additional function,
that of unofficial lobbyist for changes in available facilities. The
problem here is that it may be misinterpreted by the judge, who
may think that the psychiatrist is out of touch with alternatives
available to him. 0
10. This was a view expressed several times by judges in interviews. In an informal group
discussion, one psychiatrist made it clear that he considered it part of his professional role
to "go ahead and make ideal recommendations despite lack of available facilities. We have
every right to be as creative as possible, as professionals, in suggesting alternatives." He
recognized that judges were dissatisfied with psychiatrists recommending nonexistent alternatives. Another psychiatrist with close ties to the court clinic, also present at this discussion,
echoed these views: "The court clinic should make ideal recommendations, political feasibility aside. The court psychiatrist should give his best medical opinion and should use it.
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A classic dilemma faced by many professionals concerns the layman's belief that he is competent to pass judgment on the subject.
This problem is especially pronounced for the court psychiatrist,
who may be criticized and even advised how to write reports by the
judge. The judge, to whom in a sense the psychiatrist is responsible,
comments on what he considers the competence, or lack thereof, of
the psychiatrist. For example, on several occasions in interviews,
judges criticized the inclusion of background data in the reports, as
well as the psychiatrist's sociological explanation of the etiology of
the crime. Several judges expressed their feelings in rhetorical questions: "Why does he bother to tell me the offender comes from a
ghetto?" "What do they know about it?" "What good does it do me
to know that this fellow has led a disorganized life?" The judges
were commenting on those parts of the report which they considered
unhelpful and superfluous, and which in addition they considered
the psychiatrist unqualified to make." However, for the psychiatrist, such "background data" is considered a crucial part of his
evaluation and therefore an appropriate area of discussion in his
report.'2 Thus, one of the major difficulties in the relationship between the court psychiatrist and the judge is that each has a different view of the nature of the psychiatrist's role in evaluating a
defendant and advising the judge.
The court psychiatrist's role is further complicated by the limited
rewards, both tangible and intangible, which are available to him.
A court psychiatrist accepts a fixed salary which is likely to be less
than that of his colleagues in private practice. Furthermore, the
court psychiatrist does not have the personal satisfaction of witnessing the successful therapeutic outcome of treatment, as he might in
private practice with his "own" patients, or as a psychiatrist in an
Change is a job for the legislature." Unfortunately, judges do not share this perception of their
"political clout," and in fact often indicated their feelings of impotence in this area.
11. "The professional cannot prescribe guides for facets of the client's life where his
theoretical competence does not apply. To venture such prescriptions is to invade a province
wherein he himself is a layman and, hence, to violate the authority of another group."
Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession,in SOCIAL PERSPECTVE ON OCCUPATIONs 3-16 (Pavalko
ed. 1971).
Such criticisms by a judge may actually lead the psychiatrist to emphasize the more
"esoteric" aspects of this professional expertise. He may place greater emphasis on the use
of psychiatric concepts and language difficult for the judge to understand. He is actually
caught in a "double bind": criticized if he says something the judge knows already and also
criticized if he writes what the judge sees as "jargon." See Bohmer, supra note 1.
12. See HALLECK, supra note 4, at 247.
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institution. The rewards, insofar as they exist, are smaller and less
direct and may amount to nothing more than the psychiatrist's
satisfaction of feeling that he has made the "right" recommendation
and may thereby have helped an individual offender as well as the
community.
Another intangible reward usually available to members of a profession, that of prestige, is to some extent denied to the court psychiatrist. The difference between a "public psychiatrist" and a
"private psychiatrist" in income and autonomy apparently has the
effect of lowering the prestige of the former in the eyes of the public
and certainly the judge.
The decision to become a court psychiatrist may stem from a
personal feeling that one is giving up tangible rewards but gaining
"higher" intangible rewards. Other members of the psychiatric profession choose to deny themselves financial rewards, presumably for
this reason, for example, the psychiatrist who works for a voluntary
agency such as a drug abuse program.
There is, however, another way of viewing this self-sacrifice. The
choice may be motivated by a need for security-a fixed salary. If
the individual does not perform well as a private practitioner, the
choice to leave the private sector may be a necessary one for his
survival. Private practice requires both certain special skills and the
ability to withstand the anxiety of needing to inspire confidence in
a sufficient number of people to make a living.
There is some evidence to support the view that psychiatrists in
the public sector are less skilled than their colleagues in private
practice.' 3 The truth of this assertion is to some degree irrelevant,
however, since it is the perceptions of those who deal with the psychiatrist which are relevant here. It appeared from the interviews
that a number of the judges felt that the court psychiatrists were
"unable to make it professionally in the outside world."' 4 One must
question how seriously a judge can be expected to take the views of
For example, there is a large proportion of foreign-trained and nonboard-certified
ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 218
(1972). "Walls, acting superintendent of Florida State Hospital, admitted that at Florida
State there were only twenty-eight physicians for 5,000 patients, and that only eight of them
were licensed to practice medicine in Florida. And he confessed much more: there were only
eighteen psychiatrists, of whom four were licensed to practice medicine and only two were
board certified." Id. at 95. Ennis noted this situation is far from atypical.
14. This opinion was echoed by others whose work brought them in contact with the court
psychiatric clinic, most notably attorneys.
13.

psychiatrists in public psychiatric hospitals. See B.
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one he sees as a mediocre member of a questionable profession.
Naturally, the psychiatrists who work in court clinics must find
some satisfactory way of coping with their role conflicts and role
ambiguities. From an objective point of view, however, this may be
impossible. A professional who works in a bureaucracy (here the
court system) is inevitably bound by different rules and loyalties
than are his colleagues in private practice. As Szasz states,
in a medical situation it is not enough to note who is the doctor
and who is the recipient of his medical attention. The latter is
not necessarily a "patient" nor the former a "physician" - at
least not in the usual sense of these terms. Whenever the physician is employed by someone other than the patient, his loyalty
and responsibility to his employer must be frankly recognized.
In some cases such loyalty to third parties does not interfere
with the physician's conscientious care of sick persons. In others it interferes only slightly. In still others, it requires that the
"patient" be harmed rather than helped. 5
Thus, the professional in a bureaucracy may find that the goals
of his professional role conflict with those of the organization. More
specifically, as Szasz notes, an institutional psychiatrist may be
required by his allegiance to the institution to harm the "patient,"
something which is quite alien to the role of medical doctor.
A further problem faced by the court psychiatrist concerns psychiatric confidentiality and privilege, areas critically important to
the profession generally. Psychiatrists believe that unless they gain
and keep the confidence of their patients, they cannot fulfill their
professional role successfully. For the psychiatrist to keep this confidence, the patient must trust that his therapist will never reveal
information about the patient or the therapy and will act solely in
the patient's interest and for his benefit. Without this trust, the
15. T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 56 (1965). Such problems have been identified in several
ways by scholars in the sociology of professions:
Professionals participate in two systems-the profession and the organization-and
their dual membership places important restrictions on the organization's attempt to
deploy them in a rational manner with respect to its own goals. Second, the profession
and the bureaucracy rest on fundamentally different principles of organization, and
these divergent principles generate conflicts between professionals and their employers
in certain specific areas.
Scott, Professionalsand Complex Organizations, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 266 (H. Vollmer &
D. Mills eds. 1966).
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patient will be less likely to reveal important material, and the
therapist will less likely be able to help. Organizations representing
the psychiatric profession emphasize the fundamental importance
of confidentiality and privilege to the profession, viewing the issues
both as ethical matters and as a vital part of successful practice.'"
Confidentiality and privilege are two different but related concepts. 7, Confidentiality requires the psychiatrist to keep secret information entrusted to him during the course of therapy and is based
on the patient's right of privacy, as well as his constitutional right
to his therapist's silence. Not only is it an ethical precept, but
violation of a confidence could expose the psychiatrist to tort liability.'S Privilege is the legal right of the patient, established by statute
in many states, not to have information revealed in court by his
doctor, subject to certain statutory exceptions.' 9
16. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Principlesof Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 1057 (1973).
S.1 The patient may place his trust in his psychiatrist knowing that the psychiatrist's
ethics and professional responsibilities preclude him from gratifying his own needs by
exploiting the patient. This becomes particularly important because of the essentially
private, highly personal, and sometimes intensely emotional nature of the relationship
established with the psychiatrist . . . . The psychiatrist should diligently guard
against exploiting information furnished by the patient ....
Id. at 1061.
S.9 Psychiatric records, including even the identification of a person as a patient,
must be protected with extreme care. Confidentiality is essential to psychiatric treatment. This is based in part on the special nature of psychiatric therapy as well as on
the traditional ethical relationship between physician and patient ....
Id. at 1063.
17. For a full treatment of this subject, see C. DEWrrr, PRILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1958); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION (1966).
18. In some circumstances, the psychiatrist has a legal obligation to reveal certain information (e.g., under certain Drug Abuse statutes). In such a case, of course, there would be
no tort liability.
19. The circumstances under which a privilege attaches to a relationship are outlined by
Wigmore: 1. Does the communication in the usual circumstances of the given professional
relation originate in a confidencee that it will not be disclosed? 2. Is the inviolability of that
confidence essential to the achievement of the purpose of the relationship? 3. Is the relation
one that should be fostered? 4. Is the expected injury to the relation, through fear of later
disclosure, greater than the expected benefit to justice in obtaining the testimony? 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1940). Thirty-three states have a physicianpatient privilege. See SLOVENKO, supra note 8, at 15-16. For a list of those states with
physician-patient privilege statutes, see Louisell & Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California
1969-70, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 32 n.11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Louisell & Sinclair].
Louisell and Sinclair list thirty-two states and the District of Columbia with such statutes.
They also point out that although these statutes make no specific reference to psychiatrists,
they would be covered because of their medical background. Other therapists who are not
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Many psychiatrists believe that the concepts of confidentiality
and privilege are insufficiently broad to adequately protect their
special relationship with their patients. They fear that third parties,
particularly legislatures and courts, do not understand just how
crucial privacy is to the psychiatrist-patient relationship. "In psychiatry, where it is the very essence of the profession to deal with
the most private corners of the patient's personal life, security from
abuses of privacy form a condition without which it would be difficult to practice psychiatry and psychotherapy at all." 20
Nowhere amidst all of this ethical and practical concern of psychiatrists to improve their ,profession and protect their patients is
mention ever made about ethical or psychiatric problems in evaluation of a defendant for sentencing. Never are obligations toward
such "patients" discussed nor are any rights they may have mentioned.
Possibly, psychiatrists do not consider this a relationship in which
confidence is necessary, since it is not one in which a therapeutic
relationship is being established. However, given the reluctance of
many psychiatrists to inform defendants of their adversary role for
fear of destroying necessary rapport, the argument that no trust
need be developed and therefore no confidentiality protected seems
hollow. It is very odd, particularly in the light of the extensive
literature in the area of confidentiality, that this aspect of the psychiatric role goes unmentioned. How is it that a psychiatrist can so
readily set aside his emphasis on trust and confidentiality simply
by changing the word patient to defendant?
Confidentiality is mentioned in the literature about psychiatric
presentence reports, but with a meaning opposite that of the traditional concept-the term confidentiality in this context in no way
involves the right to privacy of the defendant.
medically trained would not be covered. Slovenko notes that two states, Connecticut and
Georgia, have a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Slovenko, supra note 8,at 39.
20. This statement is part of a report by the American Psychiatric Association summarizing an extensive study of how best to achieve maximum confidentiality. American Psychiatric
Association, Confidentiality and Third Parties,Task Force Report 9, June, 1975 at iv (1975).
The report further suggests that "[tihe principle that confidentiality should only be broken
to the minimum degree necessary to achieve its desired end applies to all circumstances in
which third parties have a legitimate right to information." Id. at v. (Many psychiatric
publications echo these concerns, as evidenced in the extensive bibliography prepared by the
American Psychiatric Association in this area: PSYCHIATRY AND CONFIDENTIALITY, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, Library of the American Psychiatric Museum Association, Washington,
D.C., September, 1974.)
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The confidentiality of a presentence investigation report of
a probation department, diagnostic center, or court probation
clinic is a matter which is receiving increased attention.
. . . The issue here is not the right of the defendant to have
information withheld from the court but rather of the court to
withhold information from the convicted defendant or his at2
torney. 1
No elaboration or explanation is given for this reversal of the mean22
ing.
The patient-therapist privilege is also a matter of great concern
for psychiatrists, as illustrated by a recent case in which a psychiatrist refused to testify in court about a patient who had undergone
therapy ten years prior to the suit. Dr. Lifschutz was cited for contempt for this refusal and took the matter to the California Supreme
Court.? Dr. Lifschutz was lauded as a hero in the press and in
psychiatric literature, for his courageous action in attempting to
broaden the psychiatrist-patient privilege and to emphasize the
2
vital need for such a privilege.
Again, privilege as it might apply to defendants being evaluated
for psychiatric reports is not mentioned in the literature. Such
court-ordered examinations generally fall within the statutory exceptions to the privilege. Other interests are considered by the law
to be more important, for example, the court's need for maximum
information for sentencing.2 5 But it is very odd to find a psychiatrist
acquiescing to a request by the state at the expense of his "patient."
See SLOVENKO, supra note 8, at 446.
22. The only other commentator who appears to have commented on this reversal of
meaning is Jessica Mitford who in discussing a prisoner's folder and its relevance for parole
board decisions stated: "While his guards are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the
contents of the folder, neither the prisoner nor his lawyer is permitted to see it. The rationale:
it contains 'confidential psychiatric material' - a curious distortion of the privileged doctorpatient relationship, which is supposedly for the patient's benefit and subject to waiver by
him. In prison, the privilege is waived not for the 'patient' or his counsel, but for policing
agencies and the FBI who are permitted full access to everything concerning him." J. MrrFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 98 (1974).
23. In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). For an extensive
discussion of this case and its implications, see Louisell & Sinclair, supra note 19. This
decision on the California statute was recently upheld in Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064
(9th Cir. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Watson, Levels of Confidentiality in the Psychoanalytic Situation, 20 J.
AM. PSYCHOANALYTic A. 156 (1972).
25. The patient also cannot be said to be coming to the psychiatrist for treatment. See
Louisell & Sinclair, supra note 19, at 34 n.25.
21.
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The role of a court psychiatrist has therefore undergone a rapid
about-face: from protector of a patient to protector of society.
Conclusion
A court psychiatrist must somehow reduce the role conflicts discussed above. He can consider interests of the state as so much more
important than those of the defendant that his behavior thereby
becomes acceptable. Alternatively, he may believe that he is actually protecting the interests of the defendant, by considering his
reports to be helpful to the defendant, either by obtaining a lower
2
penalty for him or in paving the way for needed treatment.
It is possible that the psychiatrist does not need these rationalizations because he has not internalized the concern for the rights of
his patients. He may see himself as an employee of a public institution who is merely fulfilling the expectations of the institution, the
"only following orders" mentality.
The problem is apparently more severe for those looking at the
system than those in it. The psychiatrists interviewed did not mention any concern for the contradictions so apparent to this researcher. Thomas Szasz and his associates aside, even psychiatrists
outside the criminal justice system have not exhibited concern for
the conflicts implicit in the psychiatrist's role.
The conflicts discussed above point out the contradictions between the role of psychiatrist and that of court psychiatrist. The
court psychiatrist is repeatedly forced to violate some of the most
important ethical canons of the profession. In addition he is forced
to conduct evaluation of patients in situations which the profession
as a whole regards as bad medicine.
The contradictions which have been described all emanate from
the fact that in normal psychiatric practice the psychiatrist is the
patient's person and his primary interests become those of the patient. In the court situation, the primary interests are those of the
state and the psychiatrist is called upon to sacrifice the interests of
the patient to those of the state when the two clash.
26. Research has shown that the reports do not on the whole result in a lower penalty for
the defendant. See Psychiatrist in Sentencing, supra note 2. It is also generally known that
treatment is often unavailable or inadequate. However, the objective reality of these perceptions is less important than their usefulness as ways of rationalizing the psychiatrist's behavior.

